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MANAGEMENT OF COMMUNITY ASSETS:
INCORPOREAL MOVABLES
The management of community assets which are incorporeal
movables' is an area that was not always contemplated in the revision'
of the matrimonial regimes articles. Other than the provisions
relating to registered movables, the Louisiana Civil Code has no
special structure for the management of incorporeal movables; thus,
the general rules for management of community property apply. But.
applying the general rules can create special problems because
these rules really are concerned more with immovable than with
movable property. Additionally, with some incorporeal movables,
just determining which general rule applies often is a difficult task.
Nevertheless, incorporeal movables are important community assets
whose management deserves careful consideration.
General Management Provisions
The Civil Code articles regulating management of community
property apply to the management of all property, including incor-
poreal movables. In Louisiana community property is subject either
to equal management, which is the general rule, or to one of the ex-
ceptions, which are joint and exclusive management. "Equal manage-
ment," the general provision for management of community property,'
is expressed in Civil Code article 2346: "Each spouse acting alone
may manage, control, or dispose of community property unless
otherwise provided by law."' A community asset is governed by
1. LA. CiV. CODE art. 473 defines incorporeal movables as "[lights, obligations,
and actions that apply to a movable thing ...." See also LA. CIv. CODE arts. 461 &
475. Before the new matrimonial regimes articles went into effect, the wife had no
management powers over community assets which were incorporeal movables. LA. Civ.
CODE arts. 2334 & 2404 (as they appeared prior to their repeal by 1979 La. Acts, No.
709). For the purpose of this paper, the assets discussed are considered community prop..
erty, rather than the separate property of either spouse. See Note, Classification of In-
corporeal Movables, 42 LA. L. REV. 744 (1982).
2. See LA. CiV. CODE, Book III, Title VI, § 2, arts. 2346-2355 (management of
community property). These articles were added by 1979 La. Acts, No. 709, § 1. The
1979 revision is similar to the 1978 revision. 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1 (repealed
1979).
3. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2346, comment (a). "The .. .comments in this Act are not,
intended to be considered as part of the law and are not enacted into law by virtue of
their inclusion in this Act." 1979 La. Acts, No. 709, § 7. Cf. 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 10
(repealed 1979) ("The source, notes, comments, and special notes contained in this
chapter reflect the intent of the legislature.").
4. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2346.
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equal management unless it is included in one of the exceptions to
equal management.5 The most common items of community property
subject to equal management include: movables registered in the
names of both spouses in the alternative ("Mr. or Mrs."), un-
registered movables (including money),7 the portions of personal in-
jury claims which are community property,' contractual rights,' fur-
niture or furnishings not located in the family home,'" donations to a
third party of customary gifts," and the movable assets of community
enterprises when both spouses participate in the management of the
business. 2
The two exceptions to equal management are "joint" or "concur-
rent" management' 3 and "exclusive" or "sole" management." Joint
management requires the concurrence of both spouses for the '.alien-
ation, encumbrance, or lease of community immovables, furniture or
furnishings while located in the family home, all or substantially all
of the assets of a community enterprise and movables issued or
registered as provided by law in the names of the spouses jointly
["Mr. and Mrs."]." 5 A donation of community property to a third
party also requires concurrence unless the donation is a "usual or
customary gift of a value commensurate with the economic position
of the spouses at the time of the donation.""6 Under exclusive
management only one particular spouse has the authority to manage
certain community assets." Exclusive management applies to a
movable issued or registered as provided by law in the name of only
one spouse," to the community enterprise if one spouse is the ."sole
5. These exceptions are found in articles 2347-2352 and 2355. See LA. Crv. CODE
art. 2346. comment (a). But see Pascal, Louisiana's 1978 Matrimonial Regimes Legisla-
tion, 53 TUL. L. REv. 105, 109 (1978): Assets included under equal management are
"already few as a matter of law, land] will prove to be fewer yet in practice."
6. See LA. Civ. CODE arts. 2346, 2347, & 2351.
7. See LA. Civ. CODE art. 2351.
8. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2344.
9. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 2346, comment (b), and text at notes 35-62, infra.
10. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 2347. See also Spaht & Samuel, Equal Management
Revisited: 1979 Legislative Modifications of the 1978 Matrimonial Regimes Law, 40
LA. L. REV. 83, 118 (1979).
11. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2349.
12. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2350, comment (b). See text at notes 15 & 19:21, infra.
13. LA. CiV. CODE arts. 2347 & 2349.
14. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 2348 & 2350-2352.
15. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2347. The comments state that encumbrances imposed by
law (vendor's privilege, mechanic's or materialman's lien, or judicial mortgage) are not
subject to joint management. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2347, comment (a).
16. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2349.
17. See LA. CiV. CODE arts. 2348 & 2350-2352.
18. "A spouse has the exclusive right to manage, alienate, encumber, or lease
movables issued or registered in his name as provided by law." LA. Civ. CODE art.
2351.
19821
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
manager,'"9 and to a partnership interest." If one spouse expressly
renounces the right to concur "in the alienation, encumbrance, or
lease-of a community immovable or some or all of the community im-
movables, or all or substantially all of a community enterprise," the
other spouse will have exclusive control in that area." A spouse may
also "renounce the right to participate in the management of a com-
munity enterprise."' Two additional ways to avoid the concurrence
requirement are by a marriage contract" or express mandate.' In
rare instances exclusive management rights also might be authorized
by a court.2
Because the equal and exclusive management provisions may
allow the managing-spouse to manage the entire community mass,
including the one-half interest owned by the other spouse," limita-
tions are imposed on the actions of this managing spouse. One
limitation is that when a spouse manages the entire community
mass, he does not obligate the separate property of the other
spouse." Instead, the spouse who incurs a debt obligates the com-
munity property and his separate property only. The comments
describe this system of management as being "neither a tacit man-
date granted by the other spouse nor authority deriving from
coownership."2' Instead "[ilt is an attribute of any regime of com
munity property, established by provisions of law.""
Before the revision of the matrimonial regimes articles, the hus-
band, as "head and master" of the community, could manage the
19. "The spouse who is the sole manager of a community enterprise has the ex..
elusive right to alienate, encumber, or lease its movables unless the movables are
issued in the name of the other spouse or the concurrence of the other spouse is re-
quired by law." LA. CIv. CODE art. 2350.
20. "A spouse who is a partner has the exclusive right to manage, alienate, en-
cumber, or lease the partnership interest." LA. Civ. CODE art. 2352.
21. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2348. as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 132, § 1. This
renunciation may be "irrevocable for a stated term," unlike the contract of mandate,
which is revocable. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 3027-3028.
22. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2348.
23. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 2328-2333.
24. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2985.
25. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2355. See text at note 114, infra.
26. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2336, comment (d. Article 2336 states that "[elach spouse
owns a present undivided one-half interest in the community property."
27. See LA. CiV. CODE art. 2345. This limitation is consistent with article 735 of
the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure. If one spouse is the "managing spouse," the
proper defendant in an action to enforce an obligation against the community property
is the spouse who managed the transaction involved.
28. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2336, comment (d.
29. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2336, comment (d).
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community assets without his wife's consent." By so managing he
did not obligate his wife's separate property. Although the former
articles did not give the wife the authority to bind the community or
her husband without his consent, the courts recognized this power
in some situations.3 1 For example, if the wife contracted with third
parties for "necessaries" that the husband had not provided
(although obligated to do so), the courts usually imposed liability
upon the husband for these debts even though his consent was not
secured.2 The courts formulated no clear doctrine to impose this
liability on the husband's patrimony (which included his separate
property and the community property), but the concepts of tacit
mandate and negotiorum gestio were sometimes used as a basis for
liability.3 The wife thus was able to bind the separate property of
the husband. Under the new articles, when a spouse is managing
community property without the consent of the other spouse, this
managing spouse does not obligate the separate property of the
other spouse. However, in those situations when the separate con-
cepts of negotiorum gestio or mandate apply, the managing spouse
still will be able to bind the separate property of the other spouse.'
The other limitation on the actions of the managing spouse
arises from the concept of privity of contract. This limitation, referred
to in a comment to article 2346, suggests that a spouse may not
interfere with a contract entered into by the other spouse and a
third party." The comment seems to indicate that the legislature in-
tended that conflicts between equal managment and privity of con-
tract should be resolved in favor of privity of contract. The resolu-
tion of this conflict is important because of its effect on the manage-
ment of contractual rights.
Contractual rights are included in community property, for the
community of acquets and gains is a "patrimonial mass, that is, a
30. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2404 (as it appeared prior to its repeal by 1979 La. Acts,
No. 709).
31. Comment, Liability of the Husband for Contractual Obligations of His
Wife-Louisiana Legislation and Jurisprudence, 30 LA. L. REv. 441, 460 (1970).
32. Id See also LA. CIv. CODE arts. 119 & 120.
33. Comment, supra note 31, at 441. See LA. Civ. CODE art. 1787 (repealed 1979);
LA. Civ. CODE arts. 2295-2300 & 2985-3034.
34. See LA. CiV. CODE arts. 2295-2300 & 2985-3034. Absent a clear showing that
the managing spouse is the other spouse's representative, the managing spouse will
not be able to bind the separate property of the other spouse. See LA. Civ. CODE art.
2345. See generally Trickets, Inc. v. Viser, 137 So. 2d 424 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962); D.H.
Holmes Co., Ltd. v. Huth, 49 So. 2d 875 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1951); Comment, supra note
31, at 452-457.
35. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2346, comment (b).
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universality of assets and liabilities."36 Property in the matrimonial
regimes articles thus means patrimony in the broadest sense, in-
cluding contractual rights. The contractual right, however, is to be
distinguished from the property which is acquired by the contract.
This distinction is evident in the comment to article 2346:
A spouse acting alone may manage, control, and dispose of com-
munity property acquired by virtue of a contract made by the
other spouse, unless this is property that the acquiring spouse
has the exclusive right to manage or property that requires
joint management. Nevertheless, he may not affect the legal
relations and responsibilities of the spouse who incurred the
obligation and the other party or parties to that contract, be-
cause, in principle, contracts produce effects as between the parties
only."
If one spouse contracts on behalf of the community for the pur-
chase of movable or immovable property, article 2346 seemingly
would subject this contractual right to equal management, because
contractual rights are not listed in any of the exceptions to equal
management.' Equal management of the contractual right is consis-
tent with the public policy the revision sought to achieve. Equal
management encourages sharing in the decision-making process and
participation by both spouses in the management of community
property. However, equal management of a contractual right con-
flicts with the basic concept of privity of contract. If indeed the leg-
islature did intend to adopt privity of contract, it effectively created
another exception to equal management, an exception which is not
contained in the articles regulating joint and exclusive
management. 9
Although privity of contract is a common law phrase, the princi-
36. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2336, comment (c). See generally A. YIANNOPOULOS, PROPER-
TY §§121-128 in 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 315-335 (2d ed. 1980).
37. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2346, comment (b).
38. One might argue that contractual rights are "issued or registered as provided
by law," thereby subjecting them to the provisions regulating registered movables.
See text at notes 70-75, supra. Support for this argument is found in Civil Code art-
icles 1779, 1780, 1889, and 1901, which imply that a contract must be in someone's
name. However, this requirement is not "issuance" or "registration" in the technical
sense. Also, if the legislature had intended that the provisions on registered movables
should apply to contractual rights, then the comment to article 2346 should have referred
to articles 2347 and 2351 rather than to general obligations principles. Further
evidence that contractual rights are not regulated by the provisions on registered
movables is that this interpretation ignores contracts for the purchase of immovables.
Contracts for the purchase of immovables are not regulated by article 2347, and article
2351 does not regulate immovables.
39. See text at notes 13-25, supra.
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pie is contained in Civil Code article 1780: "Those only are parties to
a contract, who have given their consent to it. ,either expressly or
by implication."4 Privity is also expressed in article 1889: "No one
can, by a contract in his own name, bind any. one but himself or his
representatives. . . ."" Louisiana jurisprudence has held that "a
third person not a party to a contract cannot sue for damages for its
breach or to recover contractual benefits."4 These principles of
privity of contract might apply to the management of community
property, thereby requiring that only the spouse who is a party to
the contract can cancel the contract, extend the time for perfor-
mance, enforce the contract, or recover damages for its breach. The
application of privity to the management of contractual rights is con-
sistent with the policy interest of protecting third parties. Third
parties should not be at the mercy of a spouse with whom they did
not contract.
The application of these principles to the management of com-
munity property is seen in the following example. If the wife orders
a car from a dealer, and the husband cancels the order, his action
would affect the legal relation between the wife and the car dealer.
The dealer should not abide by the husband's cancellation. If the
dealer does comply with the husband's request, the wife can sue the
dealer for breach of contract.'3 If, after the wife receives the car,
payments are not made, the wife is the "proper defendant in an action
to enforce the obligation."" If the equal management principle were
applied, the husband could cancel the wife's contract and sue for
performance or damages. Although the management articles ap-
parently subject contractual rights to equal management, the princi-
ple of privity of contract should prevent the spouse who is not a party
40. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1780.
41. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1889. Article 1889 resembles French Civil Code article
1165: "Contracts only produce effect between the contracting parties: they do not
harm third parties, and do not benefit them, except in the case specified in article 1121
[stipulation pour autruij." FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 1165 (H. Cachard trans. 1930). This is
similar to the Latin maxim: Rex inter alios acta, aliis neque no cere neque prodesse
potest. "Third persons can neither suffer nor profit from a contract which was neither
made by them nor for them." 2 M. PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE pt. 1, no. 1172 (11th
ed. La. St. L. Inst. trans. 1959).
42. State ex tel Guste v. Simoni, Heck & Associates, 331 So. 2d 478, 483 (La.
1976): "The principle involved, however, merely expresses the Latin maxim: . . .
[quoted in note 41, supra]." Id. at 483. See also Crowley v. Hermitage Health & Life
Ins. Co.. 391 So. 2d 53, 55 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980); Holton v. Hubbard, 49 La. Ann. 715,
731, 22 So. 338, 344 (1897).
43. See LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 686.
44. See LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 735. In this action, the husband would be a
"necessary" party.
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to the contract from affecting the legal relations and responsibilities
of the contracting spouse.
If, in another example, both the husband and wife are freelance
photographers, and the husband contracts with a third person to
take pictures at a wedding, the wife cannot appear at the scheduled
time and claim the right to take the pictures. The husband's obliga-
tion to take the pictures is personal; he has a legal duty to perform
this obligation.'" With contracts involving personal obligations, the
argument is even stronger that privity of contract will prevent the
non-contracting spouse from performing the personal obligation of
the other spouse. Although the contractual right apparently is sub-
ject to equal management by the management articles, ' since it
does not fall into one of the recognized exceptions, the wife may not
perform the obligation, for to do so would affect the legal relations
and responsibilities of her husband. When the third person refuses
to let the wife take the pictures, she will have no remedy against
him.
Management of Incorporeal Movables
Community assets which are incorporeal movables are managed
according to the framework provided in the management articles.
Incorporeal movables which are issued or registered in someone's
name will be subject to either equal, joint, or exclusive management,
depending on how the movable is registered. Nonregistered incor-
poreal movables are not included in either of the exceptions to equal
management, so they are subject to equal management. Contractual
rights and the community property portion of a spouse's personal in-
jury claim are incorporeal movables which are not registered.
Contractual Rights
In addition to the contractual rights discussed in the previous
section, other contractual rights that might form part of the con-
munity property are pledges, promissory notes payable to bearer,
subscription rights, accounts receivable, interests in pension plans,
and partnership interests. While partnership interests and community
45. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1997 & 2000.
46. See text at note 9, supra. The 1977 draft of the Quebec Civil Code regulates
this problem by classification of the property. The pecuniary proceeds of any "creative
work" are community property if they are collected during the community regime, but
the "right to divulge the work, to fix the conditions of its exploitation and to defend its
integrity remains private property." QUE. Civ. CODE 1977 Draft, Book II, arts. 90 & 131
(Service de traduction. Ministere des Communications trans. 1977).
47. See text at notes 3-25, supra.
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enterprises are governed by specific provisions," the other contrac-
tual rights are not subject to joint or exclusive management, so they
will be governed by equal management. In each case, however, the
spouse who did not incur the obligation should not be able to affect the
legal relations and responsibilities of the spouse who did incur the
obligation.
If magazine subscriptions, "book of the month" clubs, and offers
to purchase season tickets are issued in the name of one spouse,
these subscription rights arguably might be subject to the exclusive
management of that spouse. However, because no provision of the
law provides that the subscription right be "issued or registered" in
someone's name (although it is customary to do so)," exclusive
management under article 2351 does not apply. While the basic prin-
ciple of equal management could be invoked to govern such agree-
ments, since arguably these rights are not issued or registered in
one name as provided by a law covering such rights, the principle of
privity of contract ought to cover the situation to allow only the per-
son who is a party to the contract to manage the rights under that
contract.5° Once the magazine and tickets have been received,
however, they are things that form part of the community, and are
subject to equal management."
Another contractual right that the husband and wife might own
is a partnership interest, as when one spouse is a partner with a
third person. Article 2352 provides for exclusive management of the
partnership interest by the spouse who is a partner.52 Without the
exception contained in article 2352, the interest that one spouse has
in a partnership might otherwise fall under the presumption of
equal management."3 The partnership interest is a right separate
from the partnership assets; the latter will be managed according to
the partnership agreement.'
The contractual rights (and other assets) which are part of a
business owned by the spouses will be managed according to the
Civil Code articles governing "community enterprises.""5 The com-
munity enterprise articles apply only to businesses which are not
legal entities. Thus, if the husband and wife form a corporation,
48. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2350 & 2352.
49. See text at notes 73-75, infra.
50. See text at notes 35-46, supra.
51. See text at notes 3-12, supra.
52. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2352. See note 20, supra.
53. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2352, comment. See text at notes 3-5 & 17-20, supra.
Because privity of contract limits the management of contractual rights by the non-
contracting spouse, article 2352 might be unnecessary.
54. See LA. CiV. CODE arts. 2801-2807 & 2812.
55. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2347, 2350, 2351, & 2353.
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management of this corporation will be according to the articles of
incorporation."0 Likewise, if the husband and wife form a partner-
ship, the partnership agreement will regulate the partnership."
Community enterprises may undertake such activities as order-
ing merchandise and supplies, borrowing money, and selling non-
negotiable accounts receivable. If the community enterprise desires
to sell or pledge nonnegotiable accounts receivable in an effort to
avoid bankruptcy,' the ability of one spouse to sell the accounts
depends on how the business is managed. If one spouse is the "sole
manager" of the community enterprise or if the other spouse has re-
nounced his right to concur in the management of the community
enterprise, exclusive management applies and only the managing
spouse may exercise control over the accounts. 9 However, joint
management applies and consent of the other spouse is necessary if
the transaction involves "all or substantially all" of the assets of the
community enterprise.0 If both the husband and wife participate in
the management of the community enterprise, then equal manage-
ment applies."'
Article 2353 renders the sale of the accounts to a third party
voidable if the "nonmanaging" spouse exercises control dr if consent
of the other spouse is not secured when concurrence is required by
law. Therefore, third parties dealing with a business owned by a
husband and wife should exercise caution when they cannot easily
"identify at least one spouse who unquestionably participates in
management [of the community enterprise]."62 Perhaps the articles
regulating the management of the community enterprise should be
amended to clarify the meaning of "sole manager." This phrase is
presently undefined. An alternative solution is to amend the articles
so that third parties may assume that the enterprise is subject to
equal management unless one spouse has expressly renounced the
56. See LA. R.S. 12:24 (Supp. 1968).
57. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2801-2807.
58. See Tte, A Critique of the Equal Management Act of 1978, 39 LA. L. REV.
491, 523 (1979). See also LA. R.S. 9:3101(1) (Supp. 1952, 1964 & 1980).
59. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2348 & 2350.
60. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 2347 & 2350. Consent is also required if movables are
registered in the name of the nonmanaging spouse. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2351.
61. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2346. Although the articles do not state that both spouses
have the right to manage the business, article 2348 implies that this right exists. Article
2348 allows either spouse to renounce the right to participate in the management of
the community enterprise.
62. Bilbe, "Management" of the Community Assets Under Act 627, 39 LA. L. REV.
409, 424 (1979). Professor Bilbe states that the sole manager provision is "designed to
discourage transactions with a spouse whose involvement in a business operation is
questionable."
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right to participate in the management. Under this arrangement
third parties would not want to deal with only one spouse unless
shown the express renunciation of the other spouse.
Personal Injury Claims
Because the portion of a spouse's personal injury claim which is
community property is not included in any of the exceptions to
equal management, the claim will be subject to equal management.83
The community property portion consists of "damages attributable
to expenses incurred by the community as a result of the injury, or
in compensation of the loss of community earnings .... " The portion
of the claim which is the injured spouse's separate property will not
be managed by the community property management articles. 5
Because equal management applies to the community property
portion of the tort claim, the uninjured spouse might have the right
to sue to recover the community losses or to settle out of court with
the tortfeasor or insurance company. Article 686 of the Louisiana
Code of Civil Procedure allows the court to order joinder of the in-
jured spouse at the trial if failure to do so would result in an "in-
justice" to that spouse, but no provision requires that the injured
spouse be a party to a compromise agreement. If the wife is injured,
the husband arguably can agree to a transaction or compromise with
the tortfeasor's insurance company for his wife's medical expenses
and loss of her earnings, including future wages." This situation
may occur if the injured spouse is in a coma or is reluctant to settle
out of court. The insurance company probably will prefer to wait until
the injured spouse has recovered and to settle the entire claim at
once, but there will be no reason to delay if all or most of the claim
is community property or if a limit exists on how much the in-
surance company will pay.
63. Article 686 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure gives either spouse the
authority to sue to enforce community rights:
Either spouse is the proper plaintiff, during the existence of the marital com-
munity, to sue to enforce a community right; however, if one spouse is the manag-
ing spouse with respect to the community right sought to be enforced, then that
spouse is the proper plaintiff to bring an action to enforce the right.
When doubt exists whether the right sought to be enforced is a community
right or is the separate right of the plaintiff spouse, that spouse may sue in the
alternative to enforce the right.
When only one spouse sues to enforce a community right, the other spouse is a
necessary party. Where the failure to join the other spouse may result in an in-
justice to that spouse, the trial court may order the joinder of that spouse on its
own motion.
64. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2344.
65. See LA. Civ. CODE arts. 2344 & 2371.
66. See LA. Civ. CODE 3071-3083 for rules governing transactions or compromises.
1982]
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If, after the uninjured spouse settles the injured spouse's claim
for future wages, a petition is filed for separation of property,
separation from bed and board, or divorce, then the loss of earnings
that accrue after the termination of the community will be the in-
jured spouse's separate property." The money the uninjured spouse
recovered for the injured spouse's future wages, which at the time
of the settlement was considered community property, now arguably
will be considered the separate property of the injured spouse. 8 In
this situation the management articles have allowed the uninjured
spouse to manage what later is determined to be the separate prop-
erty of the injured spouse. The injured spouse might then have a
claim for reimbursement. 9
Registered Incorporeal Movables
The Civil Code articles provide a structure for the management
of incorporeal movables which are "issued or registered as provided
by law." If the assets are registered in both names in the alter-
native ("Mr. or Mrs."), they are subject to equal management."0
67. See LA. CiV. CODE art. 2344: "If the community regime is terminated other-
wise than by the death of the injured spouse, the portion of the damages attributable
to the loss of earnings that would have accrued after termination of the community
property regime is the separate property of the injured spouse." In Hall v. Hall, 349
So. 2d 1349 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977), the court held that "where the action for the hus-
band's damages and the recovery of those damages occur during the existence of the
marriage [prior to the divorce], the money recovered is community property ..... Id
at 1352. Article 2344 of the new matrimonial regimes articles legislatively overrules
this decision.
68. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2344.
69. See LA. CiV. CODE arts. 2358-2368. If the recovery money for future wages is
later determined to be the wife's separate property (because of the judgment of
separation or divorce), articles 2365 and 2367 allow the wife to recover one-half the
amount, provided the husband used the money to satisfy a community obligation or to
improve the community property. Reimbursement would come only from the community
assets, not from the husband's separate property. However, article 2365 would allow
recovery from the husband's separate property if the community obligation incurred
was for ordinary or customary expenses of the marriage or for support, maintenance,
or education of the children. Therefore, if the husband uses the recovery money for an
expense that is not ordinary or that is for his separate property, no provision allows
the wife to recover from his separate property when community funds are insufficient.
In this case the wife might argue that the recovery money was actually community
property and seek recovery under article 2366. See Note, Termination of the Com-
munity, 42 LA. L. REV. 789 (1982). The difficulty of applying the reimbursement articles
to management of a personal injury claim by the uninjured spouse shows that the
legislature did not contemplate equal management of the portion of the personal injury
claim which is community property.
70. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2346. See generally LA. R.S. 10:3-116 (Supp. 1974).
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Registered movables listed in the names of the spouses "jointly"
("Mr. and Mrs.") are governed by joint management. " And those
movables issued in only one spouse's name are under exclusive
management."2
An initial difficulty in utilizing article 2351 lies in determining
just what "issued or registered as provided by law" means. For a
movable to be managed by these provisions, article 2351 seems to
require that some provision of law either refers to or requires the
issuance or registration of the movable. Apparently these provisions
do not apply in those situations when a spouse voluntarily registers
a movable (e.g., registers a pedigreed dog) because no law
"provides" for this registration. The comments to article 2351 list
shares of stock, bank accounts, and negotiable instruments as ex-
amples of movables which must be registered." Although "issued or
registered as provided by law" is not defined, "it seems that the sec-
tion [article 2351] was meant to encompass all movable assets for
which there is specialized legislation concerning transfer or
control."' 4 This specialized legislation governing the registered
movable will determine the validity of the actions of an unnamed
spouse in managing a movable registered in the name of the other
spouse."
If a negotiable instrument is payable to the order of one spouse,
transfer of the note is accomplished by delivery with the necessary
indorsement of the person in whose name it is issued." Commercial
laws do not give the unnamed spouse authority to negotiate a note
payable to the order of the other spouse. A transferee who takes
the instrument by negotiation, for value, in good faith, and without
notice of any adverse claim to the instrument is a holder in due
course and is protected against adverse claims which may arise.7
But if the husband, by forging his wife's signature, attempts to
negotiate a note issued or indorsed to the order of his wife, the
71. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2347.
72. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2351.
73. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2351, comment (a).
74. Bilbe, supra note 62, at 427.
75. Article 2353 declares that if concurrence is required by law, the alienation of
community property by only one spouse is a relative nullity. The alienation of com-
munity enterprise assets by the nonmanaging spouse is also a relative nullity. Article
2353 does not apply to the unauthorized alienation of a movable registered in only one
spouse's name. Thus, one must look to the laws governing the registered movable to
determine the validity of the transaction. See text at notes 108-113, infra.
76. LA. R.S. 10:3-202 (Supp. 1974).
77. LA. R.S. 10:3-302 & 3-305 (Supp. 1974).
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transferee of the note will not be a holder in due course,"8 and,
therefore, will not be protected against the wife's claim. 9 For a hus-
band validly to transfer a note payable to the order of his wife, he
must have his wife's consent.'
Banking laws require that accounts with banks, homestead
associations, and savings and loan associations be registered in at
least one person's name."' Only the person in whose name the account
is listed may withdraw funds from the account or otherwise exercise
control over the account." If the spouses have a joint checking account
listed in the alternative, the account is subject to equal manage-
ment, and either spouse can write checks or withdraw money from
the account. Equal management and the banking laws also allow a
spouse to issue a stop order on a check written by the other
spouse; however, the contractual agreement between the bank and
the spouses might provide that only the spouse who writes the
check can issue a stop order on that check.
Life insurance policies are also issued in someone's name."' If the
husband uses community funds to purchase an insurance policy on
his life, only he will have the power to assign or pledge the policy,
cancel the policy, exercise conversion rights, or name the
beneficiary. 5 The wife cannot prevent her husband from changing
the beneficiary, but the jurisprudence requires "strict compliance
with the [insurance] policy requirements" to effect the change.8 If
retirement plans and annuities also are issued in someone's name,
the named spouse (employee) will have the exclusive right to
manage that interest.
78. Id.
79. See generally LA. R.S. 10:3-419 (Supp. 1974).
80. See LA. Civ. CODE art. 2985 and see text at notes 31-34, supra.
81. LA. R.S. 6:744 (Supp. 1970); LA. R.S. 10:4-104(e) (Supp. 1974). Numbered ac-
counts are not allowed in Louisiana.
82. "Any subsequent transfer of the [homestead association) funds (by a third per-
son without the written authorization of the person in whose name the account is
registered] is null and without effect." Doescher v. Marcotte, 343 So. 2d 345, 348 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1977). See LA. R.S. 6:744 (Supp. 1970); LA. R.S. 6:766 (Supp. 1970 & 1977);
LA. R.S. 6:806 (Supp. 1970); LA. R.S. 10:4-406 (Supp. 1974).
83. See generally LA. R.S. 10:4-403 (Supp. 1974); Hersbergen, The Bank-Customer
Relationship Under the Louisiana Commercial Laws, 36 LA. L. REV. 29, 39 (1975).
84. LA. R.S. 22:624 (1950 & Supp. 1958).
85. LA. R.S. 22:637 (1950 & Supp. 1958); LA R.S. 22:642 (1950 & Supp. 1958 &
1966). See Beixry v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 327 So. 2d 521, 524 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1976), writ denied, 329 So. 2d 760 (La. 1976). See text at notes 35-44, supra.
86. Morein v. North Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 271 So. 2d 308, 314 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1972), writ denied, 273 So. 2d 845 (La. 1973). See generally W. DEFUNIAK & M.
VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 123 (2d ed. 1971).
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Allowing a spouse to have exclusive management over an incor-
poreal movable that is registered in his or her name poses a special
problem for the nonworking spouse. Community assets subject to
equal management can be converted into registered movables. The
breadwinner, for example, can use the paycheck to purchase stocks
and bonds, but the nonworking spouse may not have access to funds
necessary to make such purchases. Equal management of money and
other community assets does not guarantee equal access to these
funds. Thus, "many of the most important forms of wealth will be
subject to the exclusive management of one spouse [the bread-
winner]. 87
While the Code articles do not recognize the contributions of the
nonworking spouse to the family," Louisiana jurisprudence has
recognized this contribution." As a general policy concern, "[o]ne of
the major considerations behind the community property system is
to recognize and reward a wife's industry and labor (or the
husband's, in the less frequent situation where the wife may be the
principal breadwinner) which may only indirectly serve to enhance
the community financially.""0 The articles concerning the manage-
ment of registered movables perhaps should be amended to recog-
nize and to reward the nonworking spouse for his contributions.
Several changes have been proposed which would recognize the
contributions of the nonworking spouse. One suggested amendment
is to allow the spouse in whose name the movable is not registered
to secure joint registration if the court decides that failure to have
joint registration will result in substantial injury to the unnamed
spouse." A difficulty with this plan, however, is that the unnamed
spouse who requests joint registration will then risk personal liability
in a transaction involving the movable. For example, a third party
87. Bilbe, supra note 62, at 427. See Riley, Analysis of the 1980 Revision of the
Matrimonial Regimes Law of Louisiana, 26 Loy. L. REV. 453, 496 (1980).
88. Riley, supra note 87, at 496-97.
89. See West v. Ortego, 325 So. 2d 242, 245 (La. 1975); Succession of Wiener, 203
La. 649, 666, 14 So. 2d 475, 480 (1943).
90. West'v. Ortego, 325 So. 2d at 245.
91. Bartke, The Reform of the Community Property System of Louisiana-A
Response to its Critics, 54 TUL. L. REv. 294, 332-33 (1980); Riley, supra note 87, at
500-01. But see Cross, Community Property: A Comparison of the Systems in
Washington and Louisiana, 39 LA. L. REV. 479. 487 (1979). A provision which would
have allowed the non-registered spouse to request joint registration was proposed but
not passed by the Wisconsin legislature. Wis. Assembly Bill 1090 (introduced Dec. 5,
1979), quoted in Bartke, supra, at 333 n.216.
92. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2345. See Bilbe, supra note 62, at 418-22; Tkte, supra note
58, at 509-15.
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might issue a promissory note to the husband, and the wife might
request joint registration. If the husband and wife transfer the note
to another party and promise to pay the note if the maker is unable
to, both the husband and wife risk personal liability if the maker
does not pay. If community assets are insufficient to cover the
obligation, the separate property of either spouse may be used to
satisfy the obligation. Personal liability perhaps could be avoided if
a spouse were to renounce expressly the right to concur in the trans-
action; but article 2348 would have to be amended to allow one
spouse to renounce the right to concur in the alienation, encum-
brance, or lease of a community movable registered in the names of
both spouses. 3 "The renunciation, unlike the granting of a power of
attorney or mandate, does not render the renouncing spouse a party
to the transaction. Consequently, a resulting obligation may not be
satisfied from the separate property of the spouse who renounces
the right to concur."9 Because the renouncing spouse may limit the
renunciation to a stated term or to only one particular transaction,
the benefits of joint registration arN not avoided.
An additional problem with allowing the unnamed spouse to re-
quest joint registration is that the unnamed spouse later might be
reluctant to agree to a transfer of the registered movable. As a
result, commercial transactions involving community movables
might be hampered. However, because joint registration would not
be required but only available at the request of the unnamed
spouse, and because joint registration would be limited to only those
situations in which it was necessary to protect the interests of the
unnamed spouse, the effect of joint registration on commerce will be
limited. Additionally, in the event one spouse does not agree to the
alienation of a movable registered in both names, the spouse who
wants to transfer the movable could ask for judicial authorization to
act without the other spouse's consent."
An alternative solution to the problems caused by exclusive
management of registered movables is to consider the alienation, en-
cumbrance, or lease of a registered movable by the spouse in whose
name it is registered to be an act of "bad faith" unless the unnamed
93. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 2348. With commercial paper, the "renunciation" might
appear on the instrument in the form of a qualified indorsement. See LA. R.S. 10:3-205,
3-206, & 3-304(5) (Supp. 1974).
94. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2348, comment (b). See generally LA. Civ. CODE arts. 2985
& 3021. For an area of the Civil Code which does not impose personal liability, see LA.
Civ. CODE arts. 3295-3297.
95. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2348, comment (b).
96. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2355. See text at note 114, infra. The expense of involving
the court might make this solution impractical.
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spouse agreed to the transfer or at least knew about it. 7 This ap-
proach would allow the unnamed spouse to recover for any "loss or
damage" caused by the named spouse's transfer of the registered
movable.
Remedies for Mismanagement
Whenever one spouse can manage the community assets without
the consent of the other spouse, the possibility of injury exists. The
management articles provide three remedies to a spouse who has
been injured by the other spouse's mismanagement of community
property. These remedies are available during the marriage," and
apply to the mismanagement of incorporeal movables. Article 2354
provides that "[a] spouse is liable for any loss or damage caused by
fraud or bad faith in the management of the community property.""
Before the revision of the management articles, the wife could
recover for fraud only."' In Thigpen v. Thigpen' the court required
the wife to prove two elements to recover for her husband's fraud:
"(1) the sale of property conceived with the intent to reduce the
wife's community interest, and (2) actual injury resulting
therefrom."'"1 In Thigpen the court considered the following cir-
cumstances in deciding that the husband's sale of community property
to his son was done with the intent to injure his wife: the husband
remained in possession of the property and continued to exercise
97. Riley. supra note 87, at 500. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 2354, and see text at notes
99-107, infra.
98. Unless judicially separated, spouses may not sue each other except for causes
of action Arising out of a contract or the provisions of Title VI. Book III of the
Civil Code [articles 2325-24371; restitution of separate property; for divorce,
separation from bed and board, and causes of action pertaining to the custody of a
child or alimony for his support while the spouses are living separate and apart,
although not judicially separated.
LA. R.S. 9:291 (Supp. 1960 & 1979).
99. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2354.
100. Before the revision of the matrimonial regimes provisions, article 2404 provided:
The husband is the head and master of the partnership or community of gains;
he administers its effects, disposes of the revenues which they produce, and may
alienate them by an onerous title, without the consent and permission of his wife.
But if it should be proved that the husband has sold the common property, or
otherwise disposed of the same by fraud, to injure his wife, she may have her action
against the heirs of her husband, in support of her claim in one-half of the property,
on her satisfactorily proving the fraud.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 2404 (as it appeared prior to its repeal by 1979 La. Acts, No. 709).
101. 231 La. 206, 91 So. 2d 12 (1956).
102. 231 La. at 228, 91 So. 2d at 20. Accord, Hall v. Allred, 385 So. 2d 593, 597 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1980), writ denied, 393 So. 2d 735 (La. 1980).
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control over it; the husband concealed the sale from his wife; at the
time of the sale the husband and wife were not getting along and
separation was inevitable; the property was sold five months before
suit for separation from bed and board was filed; and the husband
sold the property for less than it was worth.' 3 Proving bad faith
should not be as difficult as proving fraud.' Nevertheless, the stan-
dard for proving bad faith and fraud might be similar because arti-
cle 2354 requires proof of actual injury ("loss or damage") for both
fraud and bad faith. Presumably, the jurisprudence will develop the
meaning of bad faith. A good faith spouse would consider the wishes
of the other spouse and act in the best interest of the community.' 3
If a' spouse, by exercising the right of equal management over
nonregistered movables, affects the "legal relations and respon-
sibilities" of the other spouse, his actions might be deemed to be in
bad faith, especially where the objections of the other spouse have
been disregarded.' Bad faith, however, is not the same thing as bad
judgment."7 A spouse who takes a risk on the stock market may
have exercised bad judgment, but she has not acted in bad faith.
Another remedy for mismanagement is found in article 2353:
When the concurrence of the spouses is required by law, the
alienation, encumbrance, or lease of community property by a
spouse is relatively null unless the other spouse has renounced
the right to concur. Also, the alienation, encumbrance, or lease
of the assets of a community enterprise by the non-manager
spouse is a relative nullity.'08
Article 2353 provides no remedy for an act done in violation of the
rules concerning the movables registered in only one spouse's name
or partnership interests. One writer has stated that this "omission
[in article 2353] does not signify legislative intent to make the
management rules governing movables registered in one spouse's
name or governing partnership interests effective only between the
spouses."'00 Because the specific law of article 2353 does not cover
103. Thigpen v. Thigpen, 231 La. at 220-22, 91 So. 2d at 17. See also Pitre v. Pitre,
247 La. 594, 611, 172 So. 2d 693, 699 (1965) (the husband did not make a full disclosure
to his wife of all pertinent information); Hodson v. Hodson, 292 So. 2d 831, 837 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1974) (the husband altered and destroyed records).
104. See Riley, supra note 87, at 499.
105. Id.
106. See text at notes 35-46, supra.
107. See generally Cross, Equality for Spouses in Washington Community Proper-
ty Law-1972 Statutory Changes, 48 WASH. L. REV. 527, 542 (1973).
108. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2353.
109. Spaht, supra note 10, at 119-20. The 1978 revision provided that any act "made
by one spouse without the right to do so is voidable at the instance of the othe"
spouse." 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1 (repealed 1979).
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registered movables or partnership interests, the general law must
be consulted to determine whether the transaction is valid or null. 1
But the laws governing registered movables do not always provide
an answer."' Article 2353 perhaps should be amended to include
registered movables and partnership interests;"2 however, such an
amendment should be consistent with the laws which protect good
faith purchasers. Another possibility is to consider an unnamed
spouse's sale of a movable registered in the other spouse's name to
be an act of bad faith. The spouse in whose name the movable was
registered could then recover from the other spouse for any loss or
damage." 8
A third remedy provided by the management articles is contained
in Civil Code article 2355. This article allows a spouse 'to seek
judicial authorization to act without the other spouse's consent; it
applies only to those situations where concurrence is required. The
spouse seeking judicial authorization must prove that the "action is
in the best interest of the family and that the other spouse arbitrarily
refuses to concur or that concurrence may not be obtained due to
the physical incapacity, mental incompetence, commitment, imprison-
ment, or absence of the other spouse.""'
In addition to the remedies provided in the management art-
icles, the spouses may seek a judicial separation of the property."'
An aggrieved spouse might also have an action in declaration of
simulation if the other spouse purports to sell community property
to a third person but remains in possession of the property."' Addi-
tional relief might be provided upon termination of the community
property regime if a spouse has a claim for reimbursement from the
other spouse."'
Conclusion
While the new matrimonial regimes articles address many of the
problems involved in the management of incorporeal movables, some
difficulties remain. Uncertainty exists in the definitions of "issued or
registered as provided by law," "sole manager," and "bad faith."
110. See Spaht. supra note 10, at 120.
111. See text at notes 76-86, supra.
112. See Riley, supra note 87, at 503-04; Spaht, supra note 10, at 121.
113. See text at notes 99-107, supra.
114. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2355.
115. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 2336, 2370, 2374 & 2375. Article 2336 was amended in 1981
to make it clear that the spouses may voluntarily partition the community property in
whole or in part during the existence of the regime. 1981 La. Acts, No. 921. § 1.
116. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2480.
117. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2358-2368. See Spaht, supra note 10. at 141-42: Note, suprm
note 69, at 799-806.
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Another problem is that no remedy for the management of partner-
ship interests or registered movables by the unauthorized spouse
was included in the 1979 revision. Potential problems are also present
in the management of personal injury claims, community enter-
prises, and contractual rights. Finally, the provision allowing ex-
clusive management of movables registered in only one spouse's
name should be amended to permit the unnamed spouse to request
joint registration. In short, revision of the legislation is needed to
clarify ambiguities and to provide for the management of those in-
corporeal movables which are not specifically regulated by the
management articles.
Janis Lynn Kile
